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Abstract 
 
In this work we carried out an empirical research on a sample of 98 Italian companies continuously 
listed during 2005-2011, with the objective of deepening the analysis : we tried to verify the role played 
by the Corporate on performance and default risk, with the definition of an index of good Governance 
(scG); we tried to verify the variables of Corporate Governance that produce effects on performance 
and risk of default (Z-score and leverage); we tried to verify the difference of effects of Corporate 
governance Index on performance and risk for family business and for companies active in M&A; we 
conducted an analysis on a sample of Italian companies to measure Corporate Governance quality and 
to evaluate the relationship with the accounting and market performance and the effect on risk level. 
We find that The Corporate Governance quality presents some correlation with performance and risk 
parameters. The non family companies are better structured. They show a positive correlation between 
some Corporate Governance drivers and performance and Z-score. We can observe that le “well-
advised” firms in external strategies are able to obtain a better correlation with performance and also a 
good relation with Z-score. 
This study can suggest the definition of Corporate Governance Index according to the need to evaluate 
the opening to shareholders and stakeholders.We examine the relation between the different CG 
variables and some measure of performance and risk.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The issue of corporate governance has always been 
interesting for business economics. Several reasons 
have led scholars to address the above issue. In 
particular, in the context of management studies, 
corporate governance may prove to be an important 
determinant of various aspects of business dynamics. 
Such aspects can reconnect, for example, to the 
performance, the default risk and, nevertheless, the 
probability of the future survival of the company. 
Riskier financial conditions can be determined, in 
fact, both from internal operational dynamics which 
are inefficient and from general hostile economic 
conditions (Whitaker, 1999). In this context, the 
current economic and financial crisis has made 
companies more vulnerable and more exposed to 
situations of insolvency. The attention towards the 
relationship between corporate governance issues, 
performance and possible conditions of financial 
distress are accentuated also by the recent corporate 
governance failure, such as the Parmalat case. 
Considering the link between business performance 
and conditions of financial distress, it is interesting to 
study the possible impact of governance on 
performance indicators and default risk. For this 
purpose, we proposed a synthetic indicator capable of 
providing a measure of the quality of corporate 
governance for companies listed on the Italian Stock 
Exchange (MTA segment) in 2005-2011. A more 
accurate analysis of the impact of governance 
systems, on one side, and performance and risk, on 
the other has been conducted looking at the 
relationships between some of the parameters used to 
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build the synthetic indicator and some performance 
and risk measures. The analyzes regarding the 
sampled companies reveal generally key factors in the 
governance profile, such as the presence of 
shareholders' agreements, a Code of Ethics and the 
presence of non-executive directors who can bind 
positively with certain performance measures and 
with business value. In particular, the performances 
were observed with reference to their accounting 
profile (ROI), to market trends (CAR) and to the 
evaluation of the company's ability to create value 
(Tobin-q). The financial risk, however was measured 
both with reference to the level of indebtedness 
(Leverage), and considered an indicator (Z-Score) 
developed to realize in firms' classifications the 
financially distressed and non-distressed (Altman, 
1968). 
In order to deepen the investigation and to better 
understand better if the particular nature of the 
companies or their capacity to pursue external growth 
strategies, could affect the above mentioned 
relationships, we analyzed companies distinguishing 
them on the basis of their family nature and of their 
propensity towards the realization of active 
acquisitions. In this regard, we tried to verify the 
difference of effects of Corporate Governance 
variables on performance and risk for family 
businesses and for companies involved in active 
M&A deals. 
In these years, in fact, the discussion is lively on 
what may be the best strategies  to create value and 
“react” to the crisis (Wan, Yiu: 2009, Cartwright, 
Schoenberg: 2006). Entrepreneurs and policy makers 
are debating on the real contribution that merger and 
acquisitions can play on the value creation process 
(Bigelli, Mengoli: 1999), rather than for distraction 
and what are the different factors of attractiveness that 
a market in recession can present, including the 
opportunity to deal underestimated targets (Granata, 
Chirico: 2010). Many studies also emphasized the 
critical effects that this typology of investment can 
have on performance and on the risk, but also on the 
stakeholders system (Cartwright, Schoenberg, 2006), 
further compounded in the case of environmental jolt, 
as the current one (Wan, Yiu: 2009; Park, Mezias: 
2005). 
Analyses that involve the observation of the 
economic system in general, but particularly in Italy, 
also cannot leave aside the study of family business 
that represents an essential component of the Italian 
economic structure, as they play an important role 
also in the world economy. The family business is an 
“evergreen” research field for what concern the 
definition, its connotations, and for its contribution to 
economic growth, as well as regarding its criticality. 
One of the things that animate the debate among 
scholars about this business model is relative to its 
specific dynamics of growth. In Italian family 
companies we can find groups that became large, 
listed on the Borsa Italiana, as on other stock markets, 
very active on corporate acquisition, even cross-
border, projected to a long-term orientation. 
The analysis is based on the evidence stemming 
from a sample of the Milan Stock Exchange listed 
companies which made acquisitions in the considered 
period. The sample includes all the companies which 
resulted listed in each year from 2005 to 2011, 
excluding pure financial companies and real estate 
services companies (Giovannini: 2010;  Sraer, 
Tesmar: 2006; Favero et al: 2006). The sample 
dimension is of 98 units.  
Our major finding is that the companies of our 
sample could improve their Corporate Governance 
quality, especially in the subsample of family 
business that detect a lower value (8,5), although in 
the index there are drivers specific on the family firms 
(Executive Independent, CEO). Moreover, we must 
point out that the not family companies are better 
structured (9,8), demonstrating greater protection of 
minorities and opening to the outside. 
We can highlight a positive correlation of gGI 
values with Tobin q in static analysis. For this reason 
we can observe that the Tobin q is the only parameter 
that manages to capture a relationship. We can 
observe that le “well-advised” firms in external 
strategies are able to obtain a better correlation with 
performance and a less probability of default (Z-
score). 
We can find that are the more active in corporate 
acquisition companies that feel the need to draw up a 
Code of Ethics and it is correlated with a less 
probability of failure (Z-score) and with positive sign 
for Car. We can observe, also the research must be 
extended, that the non family firms, that present a 
better gGI show a less probability of default 
The paper is structured as follows. After a 
definition of a theoretical framework, we illustrate our 
research questions. Then, we describe the data 
collection process, the variables used in the empirical 
analysis and the statistical methodology. In the last 
parts, we discuss our findings and the limitations of 
our study. Again, we highlight that this work is a first 
step in the overall research, a work in progress: the 
study, in fact, is proceeding with an expansion of the 
sample, introducing a benchmark with the companies 
of other countries. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
QUESTIONS RESEARCH 
 
The quality of Corporate Governance models, 
imposed by a legal system or Auto Disciplinary Code, 
may be important for the proper functioning of the 
economic system (Roe: 2004). In literature we can 
find the hypothesis that improvements in practice and 
corporate governance rules, as the awareness and 
active involvement of all components of the business 
community (Brown, Caylor: 2006), can increase 
economic efficiency (World Bank: 2001). In the 
context of the different Corporate Governance we 
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mention the Baghat, Bolton, Romano (2010-page 
1806) definitions that put the rules of good 
governance first as an investment and therefore the 
importance of the measurement of its effects: 
“Corporate governance is the set of processes that 
provides an assurance to outside investors of a fair 
return of their investment”. 
Performance, accountability and supervision, are 
interdependent dimensions: managers and boards of 
Directors, being "measured" continuously for the 
results obtained by the company under their guidance, 
should improve their performance, helping the 
business performance to grow. The many corporate 
crises that have occurred worldwide in recent years 
were caused, in many cases, by deficiencies or even 
the absence of controls: the importance given to 
Corporate Governance issues by the owners and 
managers of enterprises, as well as by the market and 
the legislator have grown considerably (Baghat, et al.: 
2008; Barontini, Caprio: 2006). There has been 
renewed interest in the Corporate Governance 
practices of modern corporations, particularly in 
relation to accountability, since the high-profile 
collapses of a number of large corporations during 
2001-2002, most of which involved accounting fraud. 
In recent years the Corporate Governance issues 
are focusing on interest of scholars and practitioners, 
stimulating a cross-culture discussion, investing 
finance scholars, economists and jurists. A search for 
"Corporate Governance”, found a lot of titles, that 
analyzed the different matters, but one of the most 
important is the need to “measure”  the quality of 
firm’s Corporate Governance and the effects that a 
good governance may produce on performance and on 
the level of risk, especially about the default risk. In 
literature there have been innumerable studies 
examining the Corporate Governance best practices 
(Black: 1999; Lipman, Lipman: 2006; Tarantino: 
2008; Zaffron, Logan: 2009) and the impact of 
Corporate Governance on performance, using several 
parameters. The issue of measurement of Corporate 
Governance is still very delicate and discussed 
(Romano: 1999; Bhagat, Black: 1999). In fact, 
although on the one hand is a matter of great 
importance and to which has been given a lot of 
attention from academics and investors, on the other 
hand there is not still today a unique methodology 
universally adopted, as there is not even a unique 
meaning to ascribe to the notion of Corporate 
Governance (Bhagat, Bolton, Romano: 2008; 
Colarossi et al.: 2008). The studies of Gompers, Ishii, 
Metrick (2003) has opened a new thread pointing to 
the creation of firm level Corporate governance 
indexes (G-Index), that can concentrate the 
contribution of different drivers of the Corporate 
Governance quality. Using an index, as an aggregated 
measure of Corporate Governance quality, allows 
scholars and professionals to enjoy a significant 
advantage, because they can relate the Corporate 
Governance with companies’ performance indicators. 
After this studies there have been other contributions 
that have banked some simplification (Cremers, 
Viany: 2005; Bebchuk, Cohenm Ferrel:2009; Brown, 
Caylor: 2006) or to consider the country policy 
regulation (Bubbico, Giorgino, Monda: 2012) (tab. 1) 
 
Table 1. Most important Corporate Governance Indexes in literature 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEXES AUTHORS NUMBERS OF 
DRIVERS 
Governance Index (G) Gompers, Ishii e Metrick, 2003 24 
Alternative Takeover Protection Index (ATI) Cremers, Vinay, 2005 3 
Gov-Score Index and Gov 7 Brown, Caylor, 2006 51 and 7 
Entrenchment index (E) and  Other Provision Index Bebchuk, Cohen&Ferrel, 2009 6 and 18 
Corporate Governance Index (GGI)  Bubbico, Giorgino&Monda, 2012 76 
Font: ns elaboration 
 
These indexes are similar but different at the 
same time, both in terms of number and of kind of 
drivers. It is obvious, that considering a wide range of 
factors a more indicative index and a more accurate 
firm’s Governance measurement can be produced. On 
the other hand, it is also true, however, that adopting a 
more limited number of provisions makes the index 
far more practical, easier and faster to find all the 
information necessary for its construction. It will 
focus more attention on those few, but more reliable 
and relevant. 
For this reason, in this work, was built and tested 
a Corporate Governance index (good Governance 
Index-gGI), adjusted to Italian enterprises, taking into 
account the peculiarities of the national context. The 
main cognitive goal is to evaluate the minority 
protection, as well as the level of openness towards 
investors, particularly private equity funds, that has 
become an important partner for financial support to 
enterprises’ strategies  (see § 3). Private equity funds 
can produce significant advantages for businesses, 
including credibility, improvement of rating, higher 
visibility and increasing corporate communications, 
better access to community and international 
contributions:  in essence, they stimulate a well-
structured governance.  
Another factor of interest is the study of the 
relation between the level of good governance with 
the performance and the financial risk. In academic 
empirical studies of the relationship between 
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Corporate Governance and performance we can 
identify two research fields. In the first case, the 
analysis is centered in the study of the effects of 
Governance, such as unitary complex of choices of 
Government, for the creation of business value. The 
second group of studies, on the other hand, focused on 
the drivers of Corporate Governance (specifically the 
ownership structure, the size, composition and 
turnover of the Board of Directors and the control 
system) and the performance (Romano et al.: 1996; 
Baghat, Black: 199). Despite widespread belief in the 
importance of governance mechanisms for resolving 
agency problems (Jensen:1988), the empirical 
literature, investigating the effect on corporate 
performance, has not been able to identify a univoque 
effects. Although Gompers er al (2010), Brown, 
Caylor (2006) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) found a 
positive associations between their indexes’ rankings 
of governance quality and firm performance, 
correlations are obviously not causation. Subsequent 
work has even questioned whether a positive 
association truly exists (Cremers, Nair: 2006; Lehn, 
Patro, Zhao: 2006; Core, Guay, Rusticus: 2006). 
In addition to these studies there includes further 
research that has occupied the theme of the 
relationship between good Governance practices and 
corporate performance. 
A first example was a survey (McKinsey, 2000 
and 2002) highlights that about 80% of investors 
surveyed would be willing to pay a premium for well 
governed companies, with a majority of external, 
independent advisors. The amount of the premium, 
according to the survey, should be a minimum of 11% 
for Canadian companies, to a maximum of 40% for 
those companies operating in countries with a less 
strong State regulation. 
Other studies have also found a link between the 
quality perception of the company and the stock 
return. For example, in a study on consolidated profit 
in five years, led by the American magazine Fortune, 
it was shown that in “much admired” companies 
presented a consolidated profit of shares in five years 
equal to 125%, compared to the 80% of those "less 
experience”. 
In an economic situation in which there is a 
"struggle for existence" (Lee, Yeh: 2004; Hui, Jing-
Jing: 2008) a strong debate kicked off above all the 
relationship between Corporate Governance and risk 
of default. Among the many reasons that lead a 
company to a crisis, a large literature highlighted the 
ineffective and inefficient management and control 
systems: the problems related to Corporate 
Governance as a bad "gubernum" (Mumford, Wright 
2000 2003).   The seriousness of the causes of decline 
is expressed by poor economic performance and often 
resulting in loss of value for the companies. The 
outlook of the company is not favorable and the 
degree of risk is ever increasing (Mariani, Panaro: 
2012). An increasing attention has been given to the 
study of systems and instruments that can be adopted 
in the prevention, diagnosis of corporate crisis (Kane: 
2002, Lappalainen, Niskanen: 2009). In literature on 
corporate finance there are numerous studies on 
problem analysis and forecasting crisis (Altman: 
1977, 2000, 2002; Altman, Hotchkiss: 2006; Beaver: 
1966, 1968; D’Annunzio, Falavigna: 2004; Friedman: 
1977; Hui, Jing-Jing: 2008; Lee, Yeh: 2004; 
Mumford: 2003). So for performance valuation we 
would also to define the “state of health” of the 
companies and to detect warning signs. We decided to 
use a simplified approach but very useful and 
widespread in theory and practice, as the Z-score 
(Altman: 2000, Altman, Haldeman, Narayanan: 1977; 
Platt, Platt: 2002) and the analysis of Leverage.  
According to  the debate we formulate  the first 
research question: 
 
1. There is a relation between the quality of 
Corporate Governance and performance and 
default risk, with the definition of an index of 
good Governance (gGI) 
 
An other research field is about the contribution 
of the different Corporate Governance drivers on 
performance. We can highlight the studies that 
analyzes how a widespread share ownership can 
determine a reduction of involvement or even the 
difficult for the owner to exercise effective control 
over the management (Jensen, 1976). Studies in this 
area have shown, albeit with obvious simplifications 
and limits, a positive trend in support of the theory of 
the agency costs, highlighting how the presence of an 
active shareholder reduces the tendency of managers 
to pursue private interests and promoting value 
creation. Yet Baghat and Bolton (2008) found a 
significant positive relation between performance and 
ownership.  
The decisive balance of studies found no relation 
between Directors independence and performance, 
measured by accounting parameters or stock return 
measures (Romano: 1996; Bhagat, Black: 1999). In 
this sense, therefore, it would seem useful in terms of 
Good Governance take an ownership structure that 
requires a principal owner and not an overly 
fragmented (La Porta et al.:2000). 
The relation between voting rights and 
performance has not been as extensively studied as 
that of board composition. Not surprisingly, studies 
showed that voting rights are economically quite 
valuable (Gompers et al: 2010). There are also 
research (Forbes, Milliken: 1999) that investigated the 
relationship between the size of the Board and the 
corporate performance, and not all had the same 
empirical results. In fact, there are studies that claim 
that the increasing of the numbers of members 
determine new strategic opportunities, with 
advantages in terms of performance. Other studies 
showed that the benefits emerging from an increasing 
size of the Board are disadvantages resulting from 
lower costs due to major decision-making and 
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organizational complexity of Corporate Governance 
(Lipton, Lorsh: 1992). 
Further studies concerning the relationship 
between the components of the Board of Directors 
turnover and business performance went to analyze 
the optimum composition of it in relation to the 
number and the impact of the independent directors in 
terms of value creation (Li, Harrison:2008; Bhagat, 
Black: 2002; Mork: 1988). 
Ample space is also occupied by studies and 
research relating to the issue of internal controls. The 
presence of an effective control system facilitates the 
convergence of different interests within the 
company. According to these studies, there is a 
positive correlation between higher level of 
independence and technical expertise of internal 
control bodies and value creation (Chan, Li: 2008). 
The studies of Bennedsen et al (2009) provide direct 
evidence that CEO actions can have a meaningful 
impact on performance. In the discussion we can 
define the second research question. 
 
2. There is a relation between the Corporate 
Governance quality drivers and performance 
and default risk (Z-score and leverage). 
 
Around the world the most common large 
shareholder are families (Anderson, Reeb: 2003; 
Villalonga, Amit: 2006). It should be noted that in 
Italy the presence of family businesses has spread in a 
more marked way than in other countries (Corbetta, 
Salvato: 2004; Gnan, Songini: 2003; Gnan, 
Montemerlo: 2008). In recent years, the studies on 
this topic have multiplied, more often supported by 
empirical analysis, to deepen the “definition 
dilemma” (Rutherford et al.:2008; European 
Commission (2009); Toma, Montanari: 2010) and the 
impact that the family role could express on 
performance and on corporate governance quality 
(Litz: 1997; Miller et al: 2007; Chrisman et al: 2010; 
Sharma: 2011; Pearson, Lumpkin: 2011). The first 
crucial question is what a family business is. The 
“definition dilemma” is somewhat debated and still 
able to produce controversy. As it is well known, it is 
not possible to find an unambiguous and generally 
shared definition of family business. Being a family 
firm depends on different aspects. Some studies 
define a firm as a family business considering the sole 
extent of interest owned by family (Donnelley: 1964; 
Bernard: 1975; Barnes, Hershon: 1976, Donckels, 
Frohlich: 1991). In a progressive evolution scholars 
have additionally taken into account the presence of 
family members in the management (Astrachan, 
Shanker: 2003; Babicky, 1987; Chrisma et al: 2004; 
Churchill, Hatten: 1987; Davis:2007; Dreux:1990; 
Donnelley:1964; Handler,1990; Holland, Boulton: 
1984; Holland, Oliver: 1992; Lyman:1991; Litz, 
1995; Pratt, Davis:1986) and finally, the develop a 
synthetic indicator of capable of represent the degree 
the family involvement in the firm (Astrachan et al: 
2002, Klein et al: 2005). The importance of family 
business has sparked a growing body of studies that 
focuses on the governance of these companies. Aside 
from defining problems, we must emphasis that 
family firms are unique because the governance is 
largely determined by the family control. In fact, in 
terms of governance, ownership concentration may 
alleviate the agency problems from dispersed 
sharholdings. The challenge is that families may steer 
firms towards decisions that favor them at the expense 
of minority shareholders (Shleifer, Vishny, 1986; 
Becht, Bolton, Roell: 2003).  The family organization 
can play a crucial role in decision making. At the 
most general level, family governance determines the 
type of interactions between the family and the firms 
(such as Ownership, Board of Directors, and 
Management). Bennedsen et al. (2007) provide stark 
evidence that the characteristics of the family behind 
the firm can affect succession decisions and 
performance. The existing literature provides few 
clues into the specific ways in which family firms use 
their characteristics or structure to affect value 
(Caprio et al, 2011). Direct tests on the effect of 
governance in family firms are rare in literature and it 
can be an attractive area of research for the future. In 
this discussion we can analyze the third research 
question. 
 
3.  Corporate Governance quality drivers have 
different relation with on performance and 
default risk in the family firms and non family 
firms 
 
As previously noted, the corporate governance 
quality can influence the company strategies and 
M&A activity is a fundamental strategy for growth, 
for value creation, sometimes for the enterprise 
survival (Teece et al: 1997; DePamphilis: 2012). The 
literature on M&A is extensive: many multinational 
companies today are the result of M&A between two 
or more companies (Arnold: 2013). Most research 
argues also that M&A is one of the mechanisms by 
which companies gain access to new resources 
through redeployment, increase revenues, efficiency 
and cost reduction.  Above all M&A can be 
considered the main way for firms to grow, to create 
value (Bigelli, Mengoli: 1999;  Healy et al.:1992; 
Heron, Lie: 2002). The high incidence and volume of 
mergers and acquisitions highlights their importance 
to the corporate world. Companies are been to 
participate in M&As because by combining their 
assets with the assets of another firms they can 
achieve operating and financial synergies. Another 
type of synergies discussed in the academic literature 
results from the improvement of the target firms’ 
corporate governance. A hostile acquisition can be 
considered an important corporate mechanism to 
correct opportunistic managerial behavior; however, a 
“good governum” can influence the success of 
operations. In fact, M&A activity is sometimes 
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mentioned as the outgrowth of corporate governance 
failure. This is because numerous empirical studies 
showed that a substantial proportion of M&As destroy 
corporate value. The failure of an acquisition (Kalpic: 
2008; Marafioti: 2005) is, in most cases, attributable 
to the managerial inability and lack of a strategic 
management. Shleifer and Vishny (1991) cited agency 
problems between management and shareholders as 
the main driver of such value destroying acquisitions. 
Self-interested managers may engage in M&A 
activity to achieve their personal objectives, such as 
building an empire, at the expense of shareholders 
value (Jensen, 1988 and 2005). So with the fourth 
research question. 
 
4. In the M&A activity the Corporate 
Governance quality drivers  can produce 
different effects on performance and risk default 
 
Some transaction may results in value 
destruction if they occur as a result of the conflict of 
interest between management and shareholders of the 
bidding firm. The Corporate Governance quality is 
also most important for institutional shareholders that 
are determinant in financing M&As and restructuring 
operations. Institutional shareholders generally agree 
on the core principles of corporate governance and 
what might be deemed to be good corporate 
governance. The level of balance between the rights 
of shareholders and managers and the opening degree 
of management and control structures outwards are 
important towards institutional investors, who would 
be willing to recognize a premium for well governed 
companies (Mc Kinsey  2002): in essence “to need to 
Access” (Gubitta and Gianecchini 2011).  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The analysis is based on the evidence stemming from 
a sample of the Milan Stock Exchange listed 
companies. The sample includes all the companies 
which resulted listed in each year from 2005 to 2011 
and which realized at least one acquisition in the 
period, excluding pure financial companies and real 
estate services companies (Giovannini: 2010;  Sraer, 
Tesmar: 2006; Favero et al: 2006). The sample 
dimension is of 98 units.  
It was necessary to merge several data sources in 
order to build an exhaustive database to analysed 
different aspects:  
1) to provide measures on the number of 
mergers and acquisitions operations; 
2) to calculate performance indicators; 
3) to identify family businesses; 
4) to measure the market value of the company; 
5) to assess the financial risk of the company.  
Data were collected for the years 2005-2011, 
with the only exception of data.  
Accounting data were drawn from the AIDA 
database, the companies’ web-sites and DataStreem. 
Information about corporate acquisition activity was 
taken from the Zephyr files. The Borsa Italiana and 
YahooFinance website provided data on the 
companies’ share prices and Corporate Governance 
Relations. Gathering data on familiness was 
particularly demanding. Most of information was 
drawn from the companies’ corporate governance 
reports and from the Consob files. In some cases, it 
was necessary to consult the company’s web-site 
and/or journalistic data sources.  
 
3.1. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
 
We describe, below, the other variables used for the 
empirical analysis. 
 
Familiness 
 
In this paper, we distinguished the family firms from 
other companies, using variables well-suited to 
expose the characteristics of the Italian economic 
context and unambiguous in their definition 
(Astrachan et al.: 2002). First, we introduce a criterion 
regarding ownership and management at the same 
time, i.e. a dichotomous variable "familiness" (equal 
to 1 in the case of family businesses, 0 otherwise). 
According to this interpretation, the following are 
considered family businesses (Tab. 2): 
 
 
 
Table 2. Family business identification criteria 
 
  Ownership 
  
family member = 
0 
family member = 
1 
family member > 
1 
M
an
ag
em
en
t family member = 
0 
Non family Non family Family** 
family member = 
1 
Non family Family* Family* 
family member > 
1 
Non family Family* Family* 
* if family stake is > 20%, ** if family stake is > 50% 
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- Companies where family2 owns a majority 
interest equal to at least 50% + 1 of the equity 
capital (presence in the property). 
- Companies where at least one member of the 
family (ultimate owner) holds a package not 
smaller than 20% (Klasa, 2007: p. 346) and at 
least one member of the family is part of the 
board of directors (decisions control). 
The family presence only in the property 
criterion includes in the group of family businesses all 
companies in which control is held permanently by 
the family (regardless of the fact that there are 
families in the board of directors), for which there is 
no possibility of involuntary loss of control right as a 
result of passive take over. The choice of a high 
threshold (absolute control) of the share capital is 
based on the characteristics of Italian companies. The 
Italian context, is characterized by companies with 
more concentrated ownership with respect to the 
Anglo-Saxon benchmark, especially in the case of 
family businesses (Favero et al, 2006; Granata, 
Chirico: 2010). 
The second condition (capital control and 
administrative control) is designed to include, in the 
sample of family companies, firms that are not 
completely controlled by the family capital. So we 
have considered the presence of family members both 
as shareholders and as directors. In other words, if the 
family does not have absolute control, the family 
presence is required in the board of directors too. The 
aforementioned condition is also in line with 
Corbetta, Tommaselli (1996) and in Klein (2000). 
These authors stress that family participation in 
business can be inferred from the family control of the 
capital or, if the controlling stake is not held by the 
family, from the degree of influence of family 
members on the management. 
 
 
Corporate governance index 
 
Each of these Corporate Governance variables, 
except those relating to the existence of shareholders ' 
agreements and Auto Disciplinary Code serves as a 
dummy variable — we can assign to it a value of 0 or 
1. Since the purpose of indicator of "good 
governance", as anticipated, to measure the degree of 
protection of minority shareholders and the company's 
opening level at the entrance of new members, 
assigning values to these variables follows this simple 
and logical policy: we will assign the value 1 to the 
variable object of analysis if it reflects a greater 
degree of openness to new members or input of 
greater protection of minorities. While we assign the 
value 0 in the opposite case. With regard to 
shareholders, it was decided to assign the values 0 and 
                                                        
2
 In this first case, is necessary that family members be 
present in at least two shareholders. The term "family 
members" refers to persons related by kinship and marriage. 
1, -1, while for the adhesion to the code of conduct 
has opted for assigning values 0, 1 and 2. 
 
Performances 
 
- ROI (Return On Investment) as accounting 
performance variables; 
- CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Returns) used as 
market performance indicator (Masulis et al., 
2007), obtained, on an annual basis, as the sum of 
monthly returns of stock prices compared with 
the FTSE-All Share Italy:  
 
 
Tobin-q is the ratio of the market value to book 
value and is calculated as follows: (total asset – equity 
book value + equity market value)/total asset. Where 
equity market value is represented by market cap. 
 
Financial risk 
 
 Leverage (Debt/Equity) as financial risk 
indicator; 
 Z-Score as default risk indicator. The Z-Score 
model consists in a linear analysis in that five 
measures are objectively weighted and summed 
up to define an overall score that represents the 
basis for measuring the risk of bankruptcy 
(Altman, 1968). We decided to use a revised 
version of Z-Score to better represent the 
characteristics of Italian companies (Bottani et 
al., 2004): Z-Score = (1,981*Working 
Capital/Assets) + (9,841*Retained 
Earnings/Assets) + (1,951*ROI) + 
(3,206*Equity/Assets) + (4,037*Return On 
Sales). The operating nature of the components 
described above, make the Z-Score more capable 
than other indicators of explaining the risk linked 
to the operational aspect of the business. 
 M&A: number of operations  
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Table 3. The Good Governance Index (gGI) 
 
Corporate Governance Variables SCORE 
Typical administration  
 Traditional 1 
one-tier system 0 
two-tier system 0 
Auto Disciplinary Code 0 if not present 
1 if partially present  
2 if present 
Code of ethics 1 if present; 0 if not present 
Non-executive directors 1 independent; 0 dependent 
Executive directors 1 no family member; 0 family member 
Board of directors 1 if present; 0 if not present 
Board audit committees 1 if present; 0 if not present 
Compensation committees 1 if present; 0 if not present 
Nomination Committee 1 if present; 0 if not present 
Stockholders' agreement   0 if not present 
  1 if for minority protection 
 -1 if for majority favor 
Minority  espressed Directors 1 if present; 0 if not present 
Corporate Agreement or veto of Private Equity  1 if present; 0 if not present 
Private Equity Directors 1 if present; 0 if not present 
Nonvoting Stock 0 if present; 1 if not present 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 1 external; 0 family member 
 
4. STATISTICAL ANALYSES  
 
The aim of our analysis is to understand if and how 
corporate governance features can influence the 
performance and risk of companies. To do so, we 
collected a sample of 98 companies listed of the 
Italian stock exchange market from 2005 to 2011, that 
had an active role in corporate acquisitions. For each 
of them we have information about corporate 
governance features, performance, risk and some 
more data that we used to cluster the sample. Being 
aware of limitations due to this choice, we used a 
simple least square approach, in order to preserve 
easy and immediate understanding of results. First of 
all, we tried to build a synthetic index able to reflect 
corporate governance quality for each company. We 
listed 15 corporate governance features and built a 
matrix Amxn (m = 98 is the number of companies and 
n = 15 is the number of corporate governance features 
considered). Each element of A, that is Aij, is equal to 
1, if company i has corporate governance feature j, 
otherwise if not present 0. The synthetic index of 
corporate governance is simply given by the row-wise 
sum of the matrix A. In the following Fig. 1 we 
displayed the distribution of gGI, that, as we can 
easily check, seems to be Gaussian.  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Good Governance Index (gGI) 
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In order to discover if different corporate 
governance frameworks are responsible for different 
company performance and risk, we regressed 
companies performance indexes (ROI and Tobin Q) 
and companies risk indexes (CAR and leverage) 
versus our synthetic index gGI. We carried two types 
of analysis: static and dynamical. In the first one, we 
regressed the value of performance and risk indexes 
concerning the 2011 versus the gGI. In the second one 
we regressed the trend of performance and risk 
indexes of the last 6 years versus gGI. 
The static analysis highlighted a lower 
correlation (tab. 4). 
 
Table 4. Relation between Corporate Governance Index and Performance. Static regression results 
 
ROI vs. gGI Beta Standard Error P-value 
Const. 0,0254417 0,0460528 0,5823 
gGI −0,00423439 0,00494937 0,3950 
Tobin Q vs. gGI Beta Standard Error P-value 
Const. 0,258493 0,143490 0,0758  * 
gGI 0,0313410 0,0154371 0,0460  ** 
Leverage vs. gGI Beta Standard Error P-value 
Const. 1,21931 0,877316 0,1688 
gGI 0,00937297 0,0943842 0,9212 
 
As we can see, only Tobin Q beta is significantly 
different from 0 and shows a positive correlation 
between tobin Q and gGI. Dynamical analysis shows 
insignificant correlations between performance/Risk 
indexes and gGI. We omit the results for brevity.  
The poor explaining power of our model can be 
due to the strong heterogeneity of the sample. To 
avoid this problem we clustered the sample using 
some a priori knowledge. More precisely, we separate 
companies whose number of merging and acquisition 
activities is under the mean from companies very 
active in M&As and family business from non family 
business (Fig. 2). 
 
Figure 2. Value of gGI for different subsamples 
 
 
In the following we show only significant 
results for the four subsamples. 
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Table 5. Relation between Corporate Governance Index and Performance in companies more active in M&A 
 
CAR vs. gGI Beta Standard Error P-value 
Const. 0,373989 0,222303 0,1040 
gGI −0,0435213 0,0232948 0,0726  * 
 
Table 6. Relation between Corporate Governance Index and Performance in companies less active in M&A 
 
Tobin Q vs. gGI Beta Standard Error P-value 
Const. 0,201879 0,182826 0,2747 
gGI 0,0371954 0,0197842 0,0658  * 
 
As we can see, correlation between gGI and 
Tobin Q seems confirmed for companies who made a 
fewer M&As, whereas, for the companies more active 
this correlation disappears, it is replaced by a small 
negative correlation between CAR and gGI. To 
understand better which Corporate Governance 
component influences performances and risk, we 
regressed each single component of gGI versus both 
static and dynamical performance and risk indexes. 
We carried out the analysis for the whole sample and 
for four subsamples: high M&A/low M&A as before 
and Family/Non family business. 
We summarized significant results in table 7. 
 
Table 7. Relation between different drivers of Corporate Governance Index and Performance in the whole 
sample (Delta before index name indicates the trend of the index in last six years) 
 
Parameters Corporate Governance drivers Beta Standard Error P-Value 
Tobin Q Shareholders' agreements 0,120926 0,0558514 0,0336   ** 
Z Score Executive directors 18,0959 9,69341 0,0659  * 
CAR Board audit committees 8,14818 3,53234 0,0232  ** 
Delta Tobin Q Non-executive directors −6,86202 3,55479 0,0565   * 
Delta Z Score Shareholders' agreements 3,85124 1,87267 0,0425   ** 
Delta CAR Code of ethics −0,281618 0,0969400 0,0046   *** 
 
Table 8. Relation between different drivers of Corporate Governance Index and Performance in  family business 
(Delta before index name indicates the trend of the index in last six years) 
 
Parameters Corporate Governance driver Beta Standard Error P-Value 
ROI Executive directors −0,0559147 0,0250111 0,0310  ** 
Tobin Q Auto Disciplinary Code 0,115830 0,0598827 0,0602  * 
Tobin Q Non-executive directors 0,133420 0,0713513 0,0688   * 
Z Score Board audit committees −9,22987 2,38871 0,0004  *** 
Z Score Non-executive directors 5,26496 2,35149 0,0308  ** 
Delta CAR Code of ethics −0,196581 0,116047 0,0970   * 
Delta CAR Traditional System −0,957447 0,294817 0,0022   *** 
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Table 9. Relation between different drivers of Corporate Governance Index and Performance in non family 
business (Delta before index name indicates the trend of the index in last six years) 
 
Parameters Corporate Governance driver Beta Standard Error P-Value 
Tobin Q Board audit committees 0,546132 0,295181 0,0738  * 
Tobin Q Non-executive directors −0,197454 0,103201 0,0650   * 
Leverage Nonvoting Stock 1,22048 0,680538 0,0827  * 
CAR Board audit committees 10,9823 5,94454 0,0708  * 
Delta CAR Code of ethics 0,0251763 0,0104901 0,0203  ** 
Delta Z Score Shareholders' agreements 2,92516 1,05114 0,0077   *** 
 
Table 10. Relation between different drivers of Corporate Governance Index and Performance in more active in 
M&A companies  (Delta before index name indicates the trend of the index in last six years) 
 
Parameters Corporate Governance driver Beta Standard Error P-Value 
ROI Auto Disciplinary Code 0,0754722 0,0354757 0,0460  ** 
Tobin Q Nonvoting Stock 0,135082 0,0703351 0,0692   * 
Tobin Q Non-executive directors −0,173214 0,0709145 0,0240   ** 
Z Score Auto Disciplinary Code 9,31618 3,85258 0,0253  ** 
Z Score Code of ethics 7,82869 4,01466 0,0653  * 
Leverage Minority  espressed Directors 1,08297 0,563582 0,0690  * 
Leverage Nonvoting Stock 1,09867 0,526613 0,0500  ** 
CAR Board audit committees −0,179935 0,0794669 0,0318  ** 
Delta ROI Shareholders' agreements 3,43056 1,48887 0,0291   ** 
Delta ROI Nonvoting Stock −3,34444 1,66399 0,0545   * 
Delta ROI Board audit committees 4,44928 1,84898 0,0232  ** 
Delta Tobin Q Code of ethics 3,75000 2,07814 0,0823  * 
Delta Tobin Q Board audit committees 4,07246 1,89579  0,0408   ** 
Delta Tobin Q Non-executive directors −3,25325 1,83822 0,0881   * 
Delta Tobin Q Nonvoting Stock −3,39444 1,67320 0,0525   * 
Delta Z Score Code of ethics 3,25000 1,88386 0,0959  * 
Delta Leverage Executive directors −1,76842 0,885866 0,0561   * 
Delta CAR Shareholders' agreements 0,0233113 0,0132149 0,0890  * 
Delta CAR Code of ethics 0,0402820 0,0170433 0,0256  ** 
 
Table 11. Relation between different drivers of Corporate Governance Index and Performance in less active in 
M&A  companies  (Delta before index name indicates the trend of the index in last six years) 
 
Parameters Corporate Governance driver Beta Standard Error P-Value 
Tobin Q Shareholders' agreements 0,151405 0,0718986 0,0402   ** 
Tobin Q Code of ethics 0,162469 0,0868637 0,0672   * 
Z Score Non-executive directors 25,0033 13,8506 0,0769  * 
Leverage Non-executive directors 0,857166 0,458856 0,0675  * 
CAR Board audit committees 16,4651 5,57805 0,0044  *** 
Delta Tobin Q Code of ethics −6,43421 3,82473 0,0972   * 
Delta Z Score Shareholders' agreements 2,72052 1,33850 0,0461   ** 
Delta CAR Traditional System −0,470149 0,184731 0,0132   ** 
Delta CAR Code of ethics −0,149123 0,0836652 0,0792   * 
Delta CAR Board audit committees −0,303030 0,154782      0,0544   * 
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper is just the first step in our work in 
progress. In fact we aim to introduce a deeper analysis 
to test the gGI on other samples and in companies of 
other countries. In this direction, we can refine the 
Corporate Governance Index and test on other 
situation, such as Poland listed companies, that we are 
studying.  
Our first results, however, could enlight some 
interesting constructs. 
About the gGI we can observe that it can assume 
value between 4-13 and it presents an average value 
of 9,1 for the whole sample. Our companies could 
improve their Corporate Governance quality, 
especially in the subsample of family business that 
detect a lower value (8,5), although in the index there 
are drivers that specifically regarde family firms 
(Executive Independent, CEO). 
Moreover, we must point out that the non family 
companies are better structured (9,8), demonstrating a 
greater minorities protection  and opening to the 
outside. 
The Corporate Governance quality presents 
some correlation with performance and risk 
parameters (Lorne, Wang: 2013). 
We can highlight a positive correlation of gGI 
values with Tobin Q (tab. 6), observed in a static 
analysis. For this reason we can observe that the 
Tobin Q is the only parameter that manages to capture 
a relationship, confirming its usefulness to detect 
market performance as shown in literature (Gompers 
et al. 2003).  
Looking at the subsamples only the companies 
less active in M&A present a positive correlation 
between a “good governum” and Tobin Q; while the 
more active firms have a negative relation with the 
performance, expressed by CAR. We can observe that 
le “well-advised” firms in external strategies are able 
to obtain a better correlation with performance. 
Concerning the different contribution of 
Corporate Governance drivers we can observe that are 
specially Shareholders’ Agreements and Board Audit 
Committee that have an important correlation on 
performance. Shareholders’ Agreements present a 
positive relation on market performance (Tobin Q and 
CAR) for the whole sample (tab. 7) and for less active 
companies (Tobin Q-tab 11). Also on risk parameters 
Shareholders’ Agreements show a correlation for the 
whole sample, for the companies less active in M&A 
and for non family firms (tab. 9). We can observe that 
for these companies a better Corporate Governance is 
correlated with a lowe probability of default (Jensen, 
Meckling, 1997). We can highlight that Shareholders’ 
Agreements may represent an important minority 
instrument. The results show that the aforementioned 
agreements are more present especially in the non 
family companies, according to the part of literature 
that outlined that in more concentrated ownership the 
minority protection is lower (La Porta et al: 2000). 
The presence of Non Executive Directors 
presents negative sign for the whole sample and for 
the non family companies; it shows a good relation 
with Tobin Q for family firms in which independent 
non executive directors are more present, 
demonstrating a particular attention to this important 
driver of Corporate Governance quality. Also on risk 
parameters the family businesses present a positive 
relation with cGI level and Z-score, and less active in 
M&A companies show a positive relation with Z-
score and leverage (tab. 11) . 
The companies, in which the Non Executive 
Directors are more present, demonstrate a greater 
openness to external subjects, with important 
management activities (Overhue & Cotter, 2010). 
On the whole sample is the Executive Directors 
presence that produces a very positive correlation 
with Z-score (tab. 7). Another important aspect, is the 
role of Code of Ethics, that explain a very attention of 
the companies to stakeholders interests (in the 
broadest sense).  
We can find that are the more active in corporate 
acquisition companies that feel the need to   draw up a 
Code of Ethics. The presence of the aforementioned 
Code, is correlated with a lower probability of failure 
(Z-score) and with positive sign for CAR. We can 
consider that a Code of Ethics can produce an 
improving in reputation, especially if we consider the 
investors and the other stakeholders (i.e.: Unions, 
employers), more important for the success of M&A 
operations. In fact, the Code of Ethics has become a 
tool for ensuring fair an efficient management of 
transactions and human relations, supporting the 
reputation of the enterprise, in order to create 
confidence in the outside. Creating a Code of Ethics 
can prove the good faith of the company, in cases of 
dispute, reducing the sanctions (Jensen: 2002). 
We can observe that the non family firms 
present a better gGI, showing a less probability of 
default (Jensen, Meckling, 1997). 
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